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NO. 48668-2021
Kootenai County
Case No. CR28-20-8715

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Vincent Mendiola Cruz failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven years, three determinate upon his conviction
for grand theft?
ARGUMENT
Cruz Has Failed to Show that the District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
In what would result in his eighth felony conviction, Vincent Cruz stole a Cadillac Escalade

EXT belonging to Coeur d’Alene casino employee James Bolen from the casino parking lot. (PSI,
pp. 21, 46.) The Cadillac was returned by police to Bolen, who described it as “trashed” with
dented interior, ruined mirror, airbags and lights, the GPS system cut out, and everything stolen

from the interior. (PSI, p. 21.) Over the course of eight weeks, a body shop repaired the Cadillac
at a cost of $7,906.74. (R., pp 44-53, PSI, p. 21.) “The whole ordeal cost me a fortune,” Bolen
said. (PSI, p. 21.) “It happened at the worst time.” (Tr. p. 29, L. 13.)
The state charged Cruz with grand theft. (R., 80-81.) Cruz pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement. (R., pp. 93-95.) The district court imposed a sentence of seven years with three years
determinate. (R., pp. 109-10.) Cruz filed a Rule 35 motion within 14 days of entry of judgment,
which the district court denied. (R. 112-14, 121.) Cruz filed a timely notice of appeal within 42
days of the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp. 123-26.)
Cruz challenges the district court’s decision to sentence him to a total unified sentence not
to exceed seven years, three fixed, four indeterminate and then his motion to reduce that sentence.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 1.) Cruz has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho
201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the
burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577,
38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Bakke, 481 P.3d 1197, 1203 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2020), review denied (Jan. 20, 2021). The denial of a Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, 798, 367 P.3d
185, 193 (2016).
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In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.”

State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018)

(citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Cruz Has Shown No Abuse of the Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court applied the relevant legal standards (Tr. p. 44, Ls. 2-13.) The court
considered Cruz’s 16-year criminal record. (Tr., p. 44, L. 15 – p. 46, L. 6.) The changes Cruz
claimed to have made before sentencing had not “erased” this history. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 7-14.)
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Although Cruz had “done well” in a substance abuse treatment program, the district court still had
to protect society. (Tr., p. 48, L. 20 – p. 49, L. 3.) The district court stated that Cruz’s rehabilitation
was more appropriate on parole than on probation. (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 6-12.)
Cruz claims the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and
did not properly consider “Cruz apologized to the victim, had obtained treatment for his substance
addiction, had support in the community, had a job, and a sober place to live.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 5.) The record does not support Cruz’s argument.
Cruz continued to maintain a relative gave him a key to the Cadillac and he delivered it to
Spokane, unaware he had, in fact, stolen the vehicle. (PSI, p. 22.). Cruz has yet to take
responsibility for the theft and claimed he “was doing something with good intention.” (Tr. p. 19,
Ls. 6-9.) The district court found this story “unbelievable” in light of Cruz’s seven prior felony
convictions, three of which involved a stolen vehicle. (Tr. p. 47, Ls. 15-18; PSI, pp. 23-24, 3031.)
Letters of support from members of the Alcoholics Anonymous community related that
Cruz “recently joined,” is “still new,” has been known “only a short period,” and a community
member did not “know [Cruz] closely.” (PSI, pp.142-144.) An AA community member wrote
Cruz is “worth a second chance.” (PSI, p. 143.) It can be assumed that the community member
was unaware that Cruz had already been granted multiple “second chances.”
The district court noted that Cruz’s extensive criminal history “is not erased by a few
months of changes, as laudable as those changes might be.” (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 11-14.) In addition to
seven felony convictions, Cruz had three misdemeanor convictions, served jail terms twice in
2004, and again in 2012 and 2013, and served prison terms in 2006 and 2015. (PSI, pp. 30-32.)
While on supervision for convictions in 2004, 2006, 2012, 2015, and 2017, Cruz had numerous
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term violations involving drug use and additional crimes. (PSI, p. 23-24.) In 2006 and 2015, Cruz
took the opportunity to participate in drug court, which he completed. (PSI, pp. 31-32.) Of the 19
criminal cases on Cruz’s record, ten involve felony theft or possession of stolen property. (PSI, p.
32.) Cruz scored in the “high” risk category for recidivism. (PSI p. 33.)
The district court recognized that “protection of society is the foremost factor before the
Court.” (Tr. p. 48, Ls. 23-24.) Although Cruz requested for another probation (PSI, p. 33), but the
district court concluded Cruz could “make those changes you want to make, but they have to be
done on parole at this point,” and “cannot be done on probation.” (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 10-12.) Given
Cruz’s history and the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse it discretion when it
imposed a sentence of seven years with three determinate.
“In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the
motion.” State v. Yang, 167 Idaho 944, 949, 477 P.3d 998, 1003 (Ct. App. 2020). “In conducting
our review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the
same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” State v. Del
Critchfield, 167 Idaho 650, 654, 474 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Ct. App. 2020).
During his Rule 35 motion hearing, Cruz asked the district court for a rider or a reduction
in sentence to address his chemical dependency, and mental health issues. (Tr., p. 60, Ls. 18-22,
p. 69, L. 17 – p. 70, L. 1.) He argued that a lesser sentence would benefit himself and his family.
(Tr., p. 62, Ls. 4-11.) Cruz complained of being unable to call his girlfriend for “almost an entire
day” during a temporary lockdown. (Tr. p. 61, Ls. 19-21.) Cruz’s argument is unpersuasive. He
has had opportunities to address his issues and support his family under the court’s supervision
and has not made changes.
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The district court considered the protection of society, deterrence for both Cruz and others
in the community, and society’s expectation of punishment and rehabilitation. (Tr., p. 75, Ls. 1722.) The district court also considered Cruz’s prior felony convictions, his previous time in prison,
and the multiple violations incurred while on probation. (Tr. p. 76, L. 24 – p. 77, L. 10.)
Ultimately, the district court found that no new evidence was presented to justify a modified
sentence. (Tr. p. 78, Ls. 21-25; R., p. 121.)
Cruz has a history of theft, possession of a controlled substance, forgery, identity fraud,
and assault. (PSI, pp. 29-31.) He could not recall the circumstances surrounding all of his
convictions and failed to take responsibility for his actions in many that he could remember. (PSI,
p. 31.) Cruz claimed the assault charge resulted from his girlfriend being hit by a door as he
attempted to pull away and flee from her attack, or the false statements/illegal transfer and theft
felonies that resulted from a misunderstanding between Cruz and the seller of a car who, Cruz said,
demanded more money after Cruz legally bought the car, or the theft, forgery, and identity theft
felonies that resulted when his friends used him as a scapegoat when they were caught together in
a vehicle Cruz knew was stolen. (PSI, pp. 31-32, 34.) Cruz continues to show an unwillingness
to take responsibility or follow the court’s orders. During the sentencing hearing, the district court
directed Cruz to turn himself in to the Kootenai County Jail immediately, and repeated itself three
times. (Tr., p. 49, L. 24 – p. 50, L. 1; p. 51, Ls. 3-5.) Cruz agreed to turn himself in immediately.
(Tr., p. 51, Ls. 3-7.) Yet, Cruz did not report to jail until three days later. (Tr. p. 63, L. 22 – p. 64,
L. 14.) He claimed he did not recall the district court saying “immediately.” (Tr. p. 64, Ls. 1718.). “It’s not really an excuse,” Cruz said, “but I was just taking care of family affairs, honestly.”
(Tr., p. 65, Ls. 12-14.) “I was just busy, you know ….” (Tr. p. 65, L. 10.)
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Cruz has been given multiple chances to rehabilitate but has offered only excuses as to why
he continues to reoffend. There is an undue risk that Cruz will continue to commit serious crimes
which are harmful to other members of our community. Imprisonment is the only appropriate
punishment and deterrent.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 27th of September, 2021.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
MOLLY GARNER
Paralegal
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correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN

Deputy Attorney General
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